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PRE-DETERMINED: THE MARCH 23, 2003 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM IN 
CHECHNYA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
Conor Mulcahy*
Abstract: A common debate among legal scholars focuses on the extent to 
which the international legal principle of self-determination remains 
relevant in the post-colonial period. Even those commentators who 
consider it still to be a signiªcant, active concept in public international 
law disagree over its actual content. While many suggest that peoples 
entitled to the right of self-determination have a right to secede and form 
their own state, scholars disagree as to the circumstances under which the 
right develops. This Note examines the current status of the law of self-
determination in the particular context of Chechnya. It describes how, 
though the law of self-determination would not allow Chechnya to secede 
from Russia unilaterally, Russian abuses associatied with the March 23, 
2003 constitutional referendum in Chechnya violated Chechnya’s right to 
internal self-determination. Thus, the constitution is void under inter-
national law. 
Introduction 
 In late 2002, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that 
the government would soon hold a referendum on a new Chechen 
constitution that would give the territory signiªcant powers of self-
government, albeit under the sovereign authority of the Russian Fed-
eration (Russia).1 The vote took place on March 23, 2003.2 Election 
results showed that the overwhelming majority of eligible voters in 
Chechnya voted to implement the constitution.3 Because the referen-
dum took place during Russian military occupation of Chechnya, 
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1 Jonathan Steele, Kremlin Fends Off Critics with Chechen Referendum Plan, Guardian 
(London), Oct. 30, 2002, at 17. 
2 Nick Paton Walsh, Weary Chechens Turn Out to Vote for Russian Peace Plan, Guardian 
(London), March 24, 2003, at 17. 
3 Fiona Graham, Oct. 2002, Telegraph.Co.UK, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
main.jhtml?xml=/news/campaigns/chechnya/chechtimeline.xml (last visited Dec. 5, 2004). 
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however, many Chechens and members of the international commu-
nity questioned the validity of the vote.4 Both the decision by Russia 
to hold the referendum, and the questionable circumstances in which 
the vote was held,5 raised several questions regarding the operation of 
international law in the domestic sphere. 
 This Note addresses how the international legal principle of self-
determination dictates that the new Chechen constitution is not valid. 
Part I discusses the historical background of the hostilities between 
Russia and Chechnya, focusing on the events leading up to the March 
23, 2003 vote. Part II explores the law of self-determination and ex-
plains its relevance in the non-colonial context. Part III explains how 
the law, as applied to Chechnya before the March 23 referendum, did 
not afford any remedy to Chechens seeking independence from Rus-
sia. Part IV explains why Russia’s administration of the referendum 
caused that legal relationship to change. 
I. A Bloody History of Rebellion 
 In order to analyze the legal implications of the March 23 referen-
dum in Chechnya, it is necessary to understand the historical context 
of the territory’s current dispute with Russia. The Chechens, an in-
digenous people native to the North Caucasus, have been embroiled in 
conºict with Russia since the late 18th Century.6 The bloodshed began 
in 1783, when Russia attempted to invade the North Caucasus and de-
clare sovereignty over the region.7 In a long guerrilla war that lasted for 
over half a century, the Chechens, together with their neighbors, the 
Ingush, successfully repelled the Russian invaders.8 Eventually, however, 
the sheer number of Russian soldiers overwhelmed the residents of the 
small territories, and in 1859, the Russian government claimed sover-
eignty over the peoples of the North Caucasus.9
 Chechen resistance to Russian rule continued into the early 20th 
Century.10 After the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917, the Che-
chens and their neighbors attempted to form an independent 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Chechnya Goes to the Polls, Guardian Unlimited (Mar. 31, 2003), at http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/chechnya/Story/0,2763,926037,00.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
5 See id. 
6 See Edward Kline, History: Late 18 Century—1960, Andrei Sakharov Foundation 
Chechnya Brief, at http://asf.wdn.com (Mar. 24, 1995) (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 Id. 
10 See id. 
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autonomous republic.11 However, the Bolsheviks, the revolutionaries 
who seized control of the Russian government, soon installed a re-
gime of military occupation and reasserted Russian dominance over 
the territories.12 Continued aversion to the Russian government 
caused some Chechens to support the invading German army during 
World War II.13 As a result, in 1944, the Soviet authorities ordered the 
forced deportation of the Chechens and the Ingush to Kazakhstan, 
where almost one-third of the displaced population died.14 Thirteen 
years later, the Soviet government reestablished the Chechen-Ingush 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and allowed the Chechens and 
Ingush to return to their homeland.15
 A resurgence of Chechen resistance occurred in the late 1980s 
during the waning days of the Soviet empire.16 As reform movements 
swept through Moscow, the Soviet government allowed a Chechen 
National Congress (CNC) to convene.17 The CNC immediately passed 
a resolution calling for the sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Repub-
lic.18 When the congress reconvened several months later under the 
leadership of Chechen nationalist Jokhar Dudaev, the CNC became 
more radical in its separatist goals.19 On August 19, 1991, Dudaev 
took advantage of the Soviet government’s focus on a failed reaction-
ary coup in Moscow and organized protests of civil disobedience in 
the streets of the Chechen capital, Grozny.20 Dudaev amassed a Na-
tional Guard in a few days and used it to storm the local arm of the 
Soviet government, the Chechen-Ingush Republic Supreme Soviet, 
forcing the ofªcials there to sign an “act of abdication.”21 Eager to 
retain order, the Russian authorities dispatched several envoys to 
Grozny to establish a provisional government.22 The Chechens re-
fused to recognize that government and, instead, elected Dudaev 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Kline, supra note 6. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See Edward Kline, History: Perestroika and the Breakup of Soviet Empire, Andrei Sak-
harov Foundation Chechnya Brief, at http://asf.wdn.com (Mar. 24, 1995) (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2004). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See Kline, supra note 16. 
22 See id. 
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president.23 He subsequently declared Chechnya to be a sovereign 
state.24 Although Russian president Boris Yeltsin threatened to use 
military force to reassert Russian power over the territory, the rest of 
the Russian government would not authorize such action.25
 Thus, between November, 1991 and the beginning of 1994, 
Chechnya was a de facto independent state.26 Russia refused to recog-
nize Chechnya’s existence (and refused to let any other countries do 
so either) but otherwise did not meddle in Chechen affairs.27 Eventu-
ally, though, the Russian government used Chechen discontent with 
Dudaev’s rule as an opportunity to reassert its sovereignty over Chech-
nya, by supporting anti-Dudaev opposition forces ªnancially and mili-
tarily.28 Toward the end of 1994, constant battles between the pro-
Dudaev National Guard and the Russian-backed opposition forces 
raged in the streets of Grozny.29 Finally, on December 11, 1994, Yeltsin 
ordered Russian troops to invade Chechnya.30
 The war that transpired during the next two years was horriªc and 
deadly for both sides of the conºict.31 The Russian attack caused the 
Chechen people to unite once again against their common enemy - the 
invader.32 The Chechen rebel army employed guerrilla warfare tactics in 
their attempt to drive off the Russians, but the constant bombing of 
Chechen cities by Russian planes devastated the country.33 Because Rus-
sia also suffered countless casualties in its young and inexperienced 
army, it eventually attempted to resolve the crisis.34 The negotiated 
peace plan called for Russian help in rebuilding Chechnya’s shattered 
infrastructure and increased governmental autonomy for the territory.35
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 Fiona Graham, 1987–1991: Perestroika and Independence, Telegraph.Co.UK, at http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/campaigns/chechnya/ chechtimeline.xml 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
25 See Kline, supra note 16. 
26 See Edward Kline, “Independence,” Andrei Sakharov Foundation Chechnya Brief, 
at http://asf.wdn.com (Mar. 24, 1995) (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See Fiona Graham, 1994–1996: The First War, Telegraph.Co.UK, at http://www.tele 
graph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/campaigns/chechnya/chechtimeline.xml (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. 
34 See Graham, supra note 29. 
35 See id. 
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 The years immediately following the cessation of hostilities were 
disastrous for Chechnya.36 Plagued by a failing economy, unprece-
dented unemployment, and an irreconcilably damaged infrastructure, 
Chechnya became a haven for criminals and lawlessness.37 Simultane-
ously, a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, known as Wahhabism, 
became popular among many Chechens.38 Constant ªghting took 
place between forces loyal to the new Chechen president, Aslan Mask-
hadov, and those advocating for a more radical Islamist state.39
 Maskhadov soon became frustrated with Moscow’s continued in-
difference towards Chechnya.40 He proclaimed that Russia had de-
faulted on its promises under the peace treaty and refused to negoti-
ate with Russia without a guarantee of Chechen independence.41 
Additionally, the leaders of the more radical factions in Chechnya au-
thorized terrorist actions in Russia, hoping to force the government 
to recognize Chechen sovereignty.42
 Constantly under threat of guerrilla attacks and distressed at the 
inability to access valuable Chechen oil reserves, the Russians recon-
sidered the possibility of invasion.43 When a group of apartments in 
Moscow were bombed in September of 1999, the Russian government 
blamed Chechen rebels, although the leaders of the Chechen resis-
tance movement denied responsibility for the action.44 The newly-
appointed Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, vowed to crush the 
Chechen insurgents and, on September 30, 1999, he ordered Russian 
ground troops into Chechnya.45
 Within several weeks, it was evident that the second Chechen war 
would closely mimic the ªrst.46 The warring factions within Chechnya 
again united against Russia, and the bombing of Grozny and other 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Fiona Graham, 1997–1999: Peace, Instability and Internal Unrest, Telegraph.Co.UK, 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/campaigns/chechnya/chech 
timeline.xml (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See Graham, supra note 36. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See Fiona Graham, 1999-Aug 2001: War Once More, Telegraph.Co.UK, at http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/campaigns/chechnya/chechtimeline.xml 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
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towns caused an immense amount of destruction and death.47 Yet 
again, the Chechen rebels inºicted mass casualties on the invading 
Russian army.48 Concurrently, Chechens engaged in many terrorist 
and guerrilla attacks against Russian troops in Chechnya.49 However, 
the Russian army eventually sacked Grozny, and the Russian people 
elected Putin President of Russia for his tough policies regarding 
Chechnya.50 Putin appointed Islamic cleric Akhmed Kadyrov as chair-
person of a new Russian-backed government in the republic and reas-
serted Russian dominance over the region.51
 Over the next two years, sporadic ªghting between Chechen 
guerrillas and the occupying Russian troops continued.52 The inter-
national community accused the Russian military of terrorizing the 
civilian population of Chechnya and engaging in numerous human 
rights abuses, including secret arrests and “disappearances.”53 As 
more information regarding Russian atrocities emerged, Putin’s poli-
cies toward the troubled region became increasingly less popular in 
Russia and in the rest of the world.54
 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Putin characterized 
the continuing Russian military actions in Chechnya as his country’s 
own “war on terrorism.”55 Accordingly, Western criticism of Putin’s ac-
tions decreased somewhat in 2002.56 The Russian government repeat-
edly claimed that the war in Chechnya was over, but frequent Chechen 
bombings of Russian targets indicated otherwise.57 The most shocking 
evidence of the war’s continued existence became known to the inter-
national community on October 23, 2002, when a group of Chechen 
                                                                                                                      
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See Graham, supra note 46. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id.; see also Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, U.N. CHR, 
57th Sess., Res. 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/RES/2001/24 (2001), available at http://www. 
unhchr. ch/html/menu2/2/57chr/resolutions.htm; Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the 
Russian Federataion, U.N. CHR, 56th Sess., Res. 58, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/RES/2000/58 (2000), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/56chr/56res.htm. 
55 See Fiona Graham, Sept. 2001–Oct. 2002: “The World Changed Overnight,” Telegraph. 
Co.UK, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/campaigns/chechnya/ 
chechtimeline.xml (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
56 See id. But see Jonathan Fowler, U.N. Panel Rejects Censure of Russia on Chechnya Abuses, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 2003, at A15 (reporting that most of the countries supporting a reso-
lution censuring Russian actions in Chechnya were from the West). 
57 See Graham, supra note 55. 
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separatists took 700 people hostage at a Moscow theater.58 The Russian 
authorities pumped a gas through the theater’s vents to subdue the 
perpetrators and then raided the theater, but the gas killed over 100 of 
the hostages in the process.59 The incident was a gigantic embarrass-
ment for the Putin administration and increased international pressure 
on the Russian government to ªnd an alternate solution to the prob-
lems in Chechnya.60 Two weeks later, President Putin announced the 
government’s plan for a Chechen referendum.61
 Putin set the date of the vote for March 23, 2003.62 Very soon 
thereafter, international observers criticized the decision, arguing 
that the Chechens would be too afraid to vote against the constitution 
under the watchful eye of the Russian troops who occupied the terri-
tory.63 Notably, the chief negotiator regarding Chechen affairs for the 
Council of Europe, Lord Judd, resigned in protest when Russia in-
sisted on holding the referendum on the proposed date.64
 Notwithstanding the critics’ disapproval of the timing of the refer-
endum, the vote took place on March 23 as planned.65 In a decision 
that manifested Russia’s interest in the outcome of the referendum, 
Russia allowed the 36,000 Russian troops stationed in Chechnya to 
vote.66 An overwhelming 95.5% of the voters approved the constitu-
tion.67 Although most international bodies refused to send representa-
tives to monitor the elections for fear that they would have to endorse 
the results, the few international observers who did scrutinize the elec-
toral process found the outcome legitimate.68 In contrast, Human 
Rights Watch quickly questioned the validity of the election results: 
                                                                                                                      
58 Graham, supra note 3. 
59 See id. 
60 Id.; see Steele, supra note 1, at 17. 
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62 Walsh, supra note 2, at 17. 
63 See Tom Parªtt, We’ll Not Vote in Your Referendum, Chechens Tell Russia, Daily Tele-
graph (London), March 16, 2003, at 34. 
64 Nick Paton Walsh, Chechnya Talks Collapse, Guardian (London), Feb. 1, 2003, at 20. 
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68 See OSCE Representatives Welcome Chechen Referendum, BBC Monitoring, March 23, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 17351495 (citing Interfax News Agency); Chechnya Says “Da,” 
Russian Life, May 1, 2003, at 8. But see Lawrence A. Uzzell, Did International Observers En-
dorse Referendum?, 4 Chechnya Wkly. 10 (Mar. 27, 2003), at http://www.jamestown. 
org/publications_view.php?publication_id=1(arguing that the observers were mostly from 
members of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States). 
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Ofªcial reports on the referendum described overcrowded 
polling stations, an unprecedentedly [sic] high turnout, and 
an enthusiastic and hopeful Chechen population demon-
strating support for the initiative by dancing and singing in 
the streets. Reports by journalists and other observers who 
traveled to Chechnya independently contrasted sharply with 
this picture and cast doubt on the fairness of the electoral 
process. They reported only small numbers of voters at poll-
ing stations and noted that Grozny, the capital, was almost 
deserted (although some people in Grozny joined a demon-
stration against “disappearances”).69
Despite the criticism by human rights groups, on April 16, the United 
Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) refused to 
adopt a resolution condemning Russian actions in Chechnya, a deci-
sion that further supported the validity of the March 23 referen-
dum.70
II. The Great Debate over the Law of Self-Determination 
 International lawyers often refer to the concept of “self-
determination of peoples” when discussing the emergence of new 
states.71 Although the term is prevalent in a host of international legal 
instruments, much of the analysis by international legal scholars re-
garding self-determination has focused on adequately deªning it.72 
One multilateral treaty described it as follows: “All peoples have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
                                                                                                                      
69 Human Rights Watch, Introduction, Human Rights Situation in Chechnya, n.2 
(Apr. 7, 2003), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chechnya/index.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 20, 2004). 
70 See Fowler, supra note 56, at A15; see also Editorial, A Blind Eye on Chechnya, Boston 
Globe, Apr. 19, 2003, at A12. 
71 Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in Light of In-
ternational Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 115, 175 (1999). 
72 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 
Supp. No. 28, Annex, at 123–24, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Declaration on 
Friendly Relations]. As Professor Hannum notes, “[t]here are numerous problems in deªn-
ing both ‘peoples’ and what they are entitled to ‘determine.’” Hurst Hannum, The Right of 
Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 773, 774 (1998). 
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tural development.”73 However, deªning exactly what “political status” 
means and understanding exactly how self-determination functions as a 
principle of international law is signiªcantly problematic.74 Therefore, 
in order to comprehend the law as it applies to places like Chechnya 
today, it is necessary to examine the development of the doctrine.75
 Self-determination ªrst took on signiªcant meaning in interna-
tional legal discourse during the formation of the United Nations (UN) 
in 1945.76 Chapter 11 of the UN Charter discussed the need for effec-
tive self-government in “non self-governing territories” (NSGTs), 
namely the colonies that were still in existence after the war.77 The UN 
Charter invoked the principle of self-determination in order to legiti-
mize decolonization efforts.78 At that time, the UN did not intend for 
the principle to be legally binding; NSGTs needed to get permission 
from their colonizers in order to become independent.79 As the law 
developed, however, the international community began to recognize 
that NSGTs had an inherent right to self-determination.80 It is impor-
tant to note that even after this momentous shift in state practice, the 
law of self-determination never guaranteed outright independence to 
NSGTs, but only sanctioned a right for some type of self-governance.81
 Nevertheless, a signiªcant number of the new states that emerged 
in the second half of the 20th Century were former colonies.82 In addi-
tion, secession was the end result of the self-determination process for 
several of the NSGTs.83 Professor Grant described the reasoning be-
hind this momentous shift in state practice as follows: “[NSGTs] had 
juridical status independent of their ‘metropolitan’ or ‘parent’ state. 
Therefore, to break them away from the metropole did not violate the 
                                                                                                                      
73 ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
74 See Hannum, supra note 72, at 773–74. 
75 See id. 
76 See Jonathan I. Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor, 34 Vand. 
J. Transnat’l L. 455, 456–57 (2001)(footnote omitted); see also U.N. Charter art. 1 (de-
scribing one of the UN’s chief purposes as “develop[ing] friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”). 
77 See U.N. Charter art. 73; Grant, supra note 71, at 178. 
78 See Grant, supra note 71, at 178. 
79 See id. at 177; Hannum, supra note 72, at 775. 
80 See Hannum, supra note 72, at 775; see generally Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 
16)(recognizing the right of NSGTs to self-determination). 
81 See Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current Inter-
national Law Theories, 18 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 21, 39 (1992) (noting that “self-
determination is not necessarily synonymous with complete independence”). 
82 See Grant, supra note 71, at 182–84. 
83 See id. 
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territorial integrity of the metropole.”84 Thus, state practice arguably 
made unilateral secession by an NSGT acceptable under international 
law.85
 Legal scholars disagree signiªcantly about the relevance of self-
determination as an international legal concept in the post-colonial 
period.86 The principal difªculty involved in contemporary interpreta-
tion of the doctrine is the inherent tension between a people’s right to 
determine their own interests and a state’s right to territorial integ-
rity.87 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 outlines the conºict by 
afªrming the right of a people to determine its own political, social, 
and economic destiny, but it also warns that the right cannot “be con-
strued as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compli-
ance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples . . . .”88
 Despite the resolution’s admonition, some experts believe that 
states should construe the right of self-determination to allow peoples 
who share a common cultural and ethnic background to have an in-
herent right to secede unilaterally from the states that govern them.89 
Generally, however, the international legal community does not rec-
ognize that such a right exists under current international law.90 
Commentators with views on the opposite extreme suggest that self-
determination should only apply to colonies, and that to hold other-
wise would destroy the venerable concept of territorial integrity.91 
However, as Professor Hannum states, “[c]ementing the world’s fron-
tiers forever is an overly conservative position.”92 Moreover, the inter-
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. at 178. 
85 See id. at 177. Grant notes, however, that “[s]tatehood since World War II . . . has 
been achieved through secession only rarely. Statehood through agreement by contrast has 
been proliªc.” Id. at 175. 
86 See, e.g., Cass, supra note 81, at 31; Grant, supra note 71, at 179; Hannum, supra note 
72, at 776. 
87 See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 72, at 124. 
88 Id. 
89 See Hannum, supra note 72, at 776 (footnote omitted); Charney, supra note 76, at 
457 (describing the debate). 
90 Hannum, supra note 72, at 776 (“[S]elf-determination deªned as the right to create 
a new state would necessarily imply a right to secession. However, no state, no foreign min-
istry, and very few disinterested writers or scholars suggest that every people has the right 
to a state, and they implicitly or explicitly reject a right to secession.”) (footnote omitted). 
91 Charney, supra note 76, at 457 (describing the debate). 
92 Hannum, supra note 72, at 776. 
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national support for states formed during the breakup of the former 
Yugoslavia, and the international community’s repeated call for an 
independent Palestine, arguably indicate a general opinio juris that 
self-determination can apply outside of the colonial context.93
 Many contemporary legal theorists posit that the correct inter-
pretation of self-determination in the post-colonial era lies some-
where in between the extremes.94 These scholars argue that the law of 
self-determination should allow minority groups to have a signiªcant 
degree of autonomy within their established state and should sanction 
unilateral secession only in very limited circumstances.95 This position 
seems to outline the current state of self-determination in the inter-
national legal system.96
 When the Canadian Supreme Court wrote its advisory opinion 
regarding the legality of possible secession by Quebec, it accepted this 
view as the deªnitive statement of self-determination law as it exists 
today.97 In response to the contention that the law allowed Quebec to 
secede, the Court stated the following: 
There is no necessary incompatibility between the mainte-
nance of the territorial integrity of existing states, including 
Canada, and the right of a “people” to achieve a full measure 
of self-determination. A state whose government represents 
the whole of the people or peoples resident within its terri-
tory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and 
respects the principles of self-determination in its own inter-
nal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under inter-
national law of its territorial integrity.98
The Court then outlined two exceptions to that pronouncement.99 It 
held that, in a non-colonial context, a people has a right to secede 
under international law if it is “subject to alien subjugation, domina-
                                                                                                                      
93 See Cass, supra note 81, at 33. 
94 See, e.g., Charney, supra note 76, at 464; Hannum, supra note 72, at 776–77. 
95 See, e.g., Charney, supra note 76, at 464; Hannum, supra note 72, at 776–77. 
96 See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 276–91; Charney, supra 
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98 Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 284. 
99 See id. at 285–86. 
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tion or exploitation” or is “blocked from the meaningful exercise of 
its right to self-determination internally.”100
III. Another War: The Battle Between Chechnya and 
Territorial Integrity 
 Relying upon the current state of the law as expressed in the Se-
cession of Quebec opinion, it is quite unlikely that international law 
would permit Chechnya to secede unilaterally from Russia.101 Despite 
the Chechens’ valid demand for rights as minorities, they are not un-
der the control of a colonial power.102 Unlike NSGTs, Chechnya re-
tains no juridical status of its own, and thus is linked inextricably to 
Russia.103 The Chechens would not be able to separate their territory 
from Russia without disrupting the integrity of Russia’s existing geo-
graphical structure.104 Thus, such actions would necessarily interfere 
with Russia’s right to territorial integrity.105
 Whether or not the exceptions to the law of self-determination 
are relevant to the situation in Chechnya is a more difªcult ques-
tion.106 International law may recognize a right to secession if the 
Chechens could show that they are victims of genocide, are “subject to 
alien subjugation,” or are blocked from internal means of self-
determination.107
 The genocide exception does not apply to the situation in 
Chechnya.108 The Russian army inºicted heavy casualties upon the 
Chechen rebel army and civilian population in both wars, but the 
Russians did not do so without provocation.109 Moreover, the wars did 
not arise because of an explicit attempt by Russia to destroy the entire 
Chechen people.110
 On the other hand, one could argue that, because Chechnya was 
a de facto independent state from 1991 to 1994, the people of Chech-
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nya are “subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation out-
side a colonial context” and therefore are allowed to secede.111 How-
ever, the lack of the international community’s formal recognition of 
Chechnya during that time indicates that international law did not 
sanction the independence that Chechnya enjoyed during that pe-
riod.112 Thus, because Chechnya was never actually independent un-
der international law, it is unlikely that the “alien subjugation” excep-
tion applies.113
 The ªnal exception to the general rule promoting the doctrine 
of territorial integrity arises when “the ability of a people to exercise 
its right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally frus-
trated.”114 Professor Hannum describes the circumstances of this ex-
ception’s application as follows: 
The . . . exception might arise when a group, community, or 
region has been systematically excluded from political and 
economic power or when a minimum level of minority rights 
or a reasonable demand for self-government has been con-
sistently denied. I want to emphasize that this exception 
would not apply when a central government refuses to agree 
to whatever the minority or the region wants. Rather, it 
would apply only when the central government has been so 
intransigent that, for example, it refuses to allow the minor-
ity to speak its own language, it excludes minority members 
from participation in the parliament, or it refuses to accede 
to demands for minimal local or regional power-sharing.115
 Although Chechens are certainly a minority voice in Russian gov-
ernment, they nevertheless have achieved a limited amount of repre-
sentation.116 Russia’s willingness over the past twenty years to sanction 
the implementation of local governing bodies, such as the CNC, 
amounts to signiªcant proof of the existence of Chechens’ access to 
internal self-determination.117 Although the Chechens may not have 
enough political support in the federal government to authorize their 
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own independence though domestic law, they have the minimum 
amount of representation necessary to make the internal self-
determination exception inoperable.118 Thus, because all of the ex-
ceptions are irrelevant to the situation in Chechnya, international law 
would not allow Chechnya to secede unilaterally.119
IV. Opening the Door to Valid Self-Determination Claims 
 Because Chechnya has no legal right to secede, the March 23 ref-
erendum was unnecessary; Russia had no legal obligation to hold the 
vote.120 As authorized by the UN Charter, Russia is entitled to defend 
any threat to its territorial integrity, because such is a matter of do-
mestic concern.121 If Russia had not held the March 23 referendum, 
those Chechens seeking independence would have received no help 
from the law of self-determination.122
 However, even though international law did not direct Russia to 
hold a referendum in Chechnya, President Putin believed that doing 
so would be politically expedient.123 Therefore, against the chagrin of 
many members of the international community, Chechens (and sol-
diers of the Russian army who were occupying Chechen territory) 
went to the polls on March 23 and overwhelmingly approved a new 
constitution that supported Russian sovereignty over the region.124 If 
the international pundits were correct in identifying the election as a 
sham, the law of self-determination, previously unhelpful to the Che-
chens, actually becomes quite relevant to their future. 
 Although international law generally does not allow for unilateral 
secession in the non-colonial context, the law supports secession if it 
takes place through the existing constitutional structure of the state 
from which the territory wishes to secede.125 Thus, if the people of 
Chechnya were able to garner enough political support in the central 
government to pass a law allowing for Chechen independence, seces-
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sion in that context would be valid under international law.126 Al-
though the March 23 referendum asked the Chechens if they wished to 
adopt a new constitution, the real issue at hand was whether a majority 
would surrender any hope for independence in exchange for the 
promise of stability.127 In other words, one could categorize the refer-
endum as the most fundamental type of internal self-determination.128
 Admittedly, it is true that the referendum did not ask the Che-
chens whether they wanted to secede.129 However, the referendum 
did ask whether the Chechens desired to submit to Russian authority 
by approving the new constitution.130 Obviously, a person could not 
vote to be subject to Russian sovereignty and simultaneously support 
Chechen independence; the two positions are mutually exclusive.131 
Thus, the referendum implicitly inquired if the voter supported Che-
chen independence.132
 In theory, by putting the question to a vote, the Russian govern-
ment allowed the voters to use the existing Russian governmental struc-
ture to manifest their wishes.133 Consequently, because the referendum 
implicated internal self-determination issues, which are not subject to 
the limitations of territorial integrity, Russia forfeited its claims to the 
protection of the doctrine by holding the referendum.134 Still, if the 
vote had been fair, without Russian governmental inºuence, Chechens 
who voted against the constitution would have no remedy at interna-
tional law.135 The will of the majority, properly expressed in a vote 
within the constitutional framework of the dominant state, is in accord 
with the fundamental principles of self-determination.136
 The problem, however, is that the election was not fair.137 With 
thousands of Russian troops in the streets, and the fear of future “dis-
appearances” on their minds, many Chechens voted for the constitu-
tion because they feared that a “no” vote would bring violent reprisals 
from the Russian army.138 In addition, all members of the occupying 
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Russian military could vote.139 The few international observers who 
agreed to monitor the voting process afªrmed the results, but many 
of them came from countries that have a questionable record of elec-
tion abuses themselves.140 Indeed, many of the observers hailed from 
other former Soviet republics.141
 Some anecdotes by reporters illustrate the illegitimacy of the ref-
erendum.142 A reporter from the British newspaper The Guardian 
walked into a polling location and cast a vote in favor of the constitu-
tion without having to present any identiªcation.143 In addition, a 
journalist witnessed the Russian electoral commission representative 
at one polling booth write on a piece of paper the number of people 
who had voted.144 Out of 1,085 potential voters, 1,002 had voted by 6 
p.m.145 However, the actual time was still only 3:45 p.m.146 Such prac-
tices certainly indicate a tainted election.147
 It is evident that the actions of the Russian government and mili-
tary surrounding the March 23 referendum effectively blocked the 
Chechen people from meaningful exercise of their right to internal 
self-determination.148 The Russians were under no legal obligation to 
hold the referendum, but once they sanctioned the vote, they had a 
good faith duty to let the Chechens freely exercise their right to in-
ternal self-determination.149 Although it is quite possible that the ma-
jority of Chechens would support the establishment of the new consti-
tution, the actions of the Russian government have made it impossible 
to know what the will of the Chechen majority actually is.150 As such, 
the international community should not accept the legality of the new 
constitution until the Russian military retreats from Chechnya and 
the Chechens hold a referendum that is genuinely free and fair.151
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Conclusion 
 The law of self-determination, in a non-colonial context, is only 
narrowly operative. However, the people of a territory may secede if 
their parent country subjects them to genocide or other forms of sig-
niªcant subjugation, or if their parent country denies them the mean-
ingful exercise of internal self-determination. The people of Chech-
nya do not fall into these categories, and therefore have no right to 
unilateral secession. However, the March 23 referendum opened the 
door to internal self-determination claims by Chechnya. The Russian 
government’s interference with the referendum breached its duties 
under the law of internal self-determination. Therefore, the constitu-
tion supposedly adopted by the Chechens is void. 
